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Beautiful Lotuses, Beautiful Roses 
TOWARDS THE CONSTRUCTION OF A POLYPHONIC,
MONADOLOGICAL, CREATIVE SPACE
Masaru Yoneyama
The lotus is a well-known symbol of the East, and the rose that of the
West. However, the reason for putting them in the plural form for the
title of this conference is to emphasize the fact that even within both the
so-called “Eastern” and “Western” cultures, there actually exists a wide
variety of differences which should not be ignored. The world’s various
cultures have truly flowered each in their own way: the question
remains as to whether people who have grown up under the influence
of one, can really learn to appreciate the beauty of another one, perhaps
a very different one. Can we even learn to find the differences them-
selves that exist so clearly between one culture and another, truly as
beautiful as they are?
I believe that these questions are very important for our day, and con-
cern both our academic study and our social lives. Just what does it mean
to truly understand a different culture, indeed, how do we understand the
concept of culture itself? This question is being newly addressed in our
time. It has been a long time since investigations of culture have been
referring to such concepts as “interculturality”, “multiculturality” and
“transculturality”, and these discussions have often attempted to use
these concepts to uproot traditional ideas of culture. One researcher calls
such traditional interpretations of culture “unificatory”, (monolithic)
“folk-bound” (ethnically or regionally defined) and “separatory” (divi-
sive in their effects) (Welsch1). When we refer to traditional concepts of
culture, and think of cultures as “islands” or “spheres,” we tend to take
such ideas for granted as the “inner homogenization” within each cul-
ture, and their “outer separation” from each other. In this way, intercul-
tural conflicts would seem almost inevitable. It therefore becomes bene-
ficial to think rather of transculturality, which allows for each culture to
influence each other and even depend on each other for their very
existence. However, we have to closely investigate the kinds of relation-
ships that can exist between cultures. To speak of relationships of course
does not exclude even the possibility of mutually destructive ones! For
this reason, in order to reduce intercultural conflicts and instead develop
truly harmonious relationships, we must look into what the origins are of
this way of thinking of cultures as “islands” or “spheres.” We must care-
fully investigate how we arrived at the idea of cultures as things existing
as monolithic, independent units; as things that would continue to exist
unchanged even if removed from their contexts. When we think about
culture in general, we sometimes start from assumptions the very exis-
tence of which we are unaware, assumptions which may lead us
inevitably into the very conflicts we most wish to avoid. I personally think
one origin of these assumptions lies in the paradigms of Western scientific
thinking: a fundamentally atomistic approach. This approach seems to
rear its head not only in discussions of matter and its properties, but also
in various other areas where its application would seem more dubious.
One such area worth mentioning is the coveted Western “individualism,”
where we can clearly see the word “individual” itself, implies a definition
of the person as an “indivisible unit.”The parallels here are obvious with
the Greek idea of the “atomon (tomon)”. When these atomistic para-
digms are applied to the mind itself, we see philosophers and logicians
seeking “simple ideas” and “logical atoms.” In linguistics as well, we only
have to remember the kind of research being done, until Saussure finally
gave his field the freedom to study languages as “systems of units that are
not in themselves objective substances.”2 In each field above, we can see
customary paradigms applied of the fundamental units of each field
being independent, permanent and unchangeable.
According to the atomistic way of seeing things, the fundamental
elements comprising our world are as it were completely solid: they are
defined as being indestructible.3 Furthermore, in whatever context these
atoms may be found, they remain completely unchanged, because they
are impenetrable by anything else. As these atoms are uncomposed and
partless, by definition they have no “inside”: only external relationships
may be postulated of them.4 They are as it were pure being: they have no
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parts which could be differentiated from the whole, they find their exis-
tence solely in the relative movement, friction or pressure they exert on
all the other atoms at any given moment.5 As they have no “inside,” they
possess absolute impenetrability: the atomistic approach understands
physical existence in terms of an impenetrable mass, une masse
impénétrable. In spite of the fact that Leibniz stated long ago that real
bodies, le corps réel, did not exist in this way, modern physics continued
to seek ever smaller indivisible particles, and this search finally led them
to the concept of fields instead.6 With the rise of quantum theory, it
became clear that the ultimate particles of matter were in fact really not
particles at all, but rather vibrating sets of quantum fields.7
And so even though matter itself is now finally comprehensible in
these terms, many other aspects of our daily experience have not
benefited from this development, and continue to be understood in old
“atomistic” ways. Our approach to various problems is often still to
analyze them into elements which are completely “other” with respect
to the remaining elements of the problem.8 Even today, the majority of
the discussions of culture-related issues seem to remain along these
lines, treating questions of humanity and society with the same tools as
used to be used for analyses of physical matter. This may perhaps be
traceable to the overwhelming success of the physical sciences solving
so many of the problems in our daily lives.
In order to understand how this success was possible, it may be
useful to see what Bergson had to say about the origin of this concept
of “impenetrability”: he describes this concept as arising simultane-
ously with that of number itself.9 Material objects (les choses matérielles)
enter into mutual relationships in which they are completely external to
each other (partes extra partes), as they are to the observing subject as
well. When defined in this way, it becomes possible to then define the
space or separation lying between them, as well as to determine their
outlines or forms, which arise on a uniform background or “empty
space” surrounding them.10 It is easy to see how this way of thinking
arises, by taking a closer look at just how it is we go about “counting”
things. If we take humans as an example, each one will of course have
his or her own personality, making for qualitative differences between
them. If we take these personalities too closely into consideration,
however, we will find ourselves unable to count them, because they will
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seem to us as all qualitatively different units; apples and oranges, as it
were. Seeing them in this way, each one will appear to us as
irreplaceable individuals, which indeed they of course are. When we
wish to count them, however, we will have to consider them not as
qualitatively different individuals, but rather simply as specimens of the
uniform category of “humanity.” We can then go about counting “one
person, two people, three people…” and so on. It is also important to
note in this connection that the counting is done by a conscious
perceiver of the objects to be counted; indeed, the counting depends for
its very existence upon the presence of such a perceiver. Every one of
the objects to be counted must seem to such a perceiver, at least for the
moment, to not be qualitatively different from the others, they must
seem “all the same,” as it were.
If we understand this sort of mental “levelling” that must occur for
counting to be possible, therefore, we have a reference point for then
understanding the viewpoint of transculturalism: its viewpoint is at the
completely opposite pole, where qualitative differences are recognized
and appreciated to the greatest possible extent. The best we can arrive
at with an approach which would attempt to  cultures by reducing them
to their common denominator, is a kind of “multiculturality”. If we
then attempt discussions of “interculturality”, we still get the feeling of
being trapped in one of the world’s “cultures” defined in generic terms,
somehow trying to “join hands across the divide,” as it were, with
members of “other cultures” similarly defined. Those who work in
academic or research fields may also recognize a similar phenomenon
at work in so-called “interdisciplinary” efforts and studies! 
I wish to show below that by carefully analyzing the above situation
and questioning its fundamental assumptions, we may arrive at a new
way of thinking about the meaning of space. We may often uncon-
sciously tend to see space just as something used by the mind “to count
items in”, as a place or milieu for the mind to create number, as it
were.11 By rising above this simple way of considering space to be just
“empty”, we can start to understand a qualitatively different kind of
“space”, one that will provide adequate foundations for an under-
standing of true transculturality. On the other hand, we can get an idea
of just how far so-called “globalization” has progressed, when we find
all cultures looking roughly the same, ready for counting! The world
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may boast many cultures, but if they all resemble each other, it will be
the same as if they were only various extensions of one culture after all.
In order to avoid this danger, I would prefer to picture a space in which
a discussion of the real differences between cultures would remain
possible. In order to distance this view from the “atomistic” kind12
described at length above, I would like to offer the term “monadological
space” as an alternative.13 In my discussion below, I will describe just
what kind of space qualifies as “monadological”, and then also offer the
term “polyphonic space” as an even further development of its basic
principles.
First, “monadological space” would have as one of its defining fea-
tures the fact that the space itself is seen, not merely as quantitative and
empty as in modern physics, but rather as qualitative and meaning-
filled. By taking a new look at these old philosophical chestnuts, quan-
tity and quality, we can arrive at new ways of seeing and discussing
culture-related issues. A qualitative space would allow for cultures not
just to have an “external” relationship with each other, but rather to
fully communicate and even transform each other in the process. Each
culture finds itself in an intimate relationship with other cultures, and
aspects of one are internalized into others, sometimes forming impor-
tant cultural strata within each other as they are assimilated and
digested. This process of mutual interpenetration allows for a true
fusion, which only then, in a way that might seem contradictory, allows
for their distinctive individual traits to shine forth. We can clearly see
here that cultures cannot be considered as the impenetrable atoms of
traditional physics. The French philosopher Michel Serres calls the
things arising in the context of kind of qualitative space, “mixed”
(mêlé): “the philosophy to come, which will grasp this process of
“mixing”, will succeed in smoothly unifying the whole and its various
parts, on the basis of completely different ontological assumptions than
the ones we now have.” 14 Clearly, here we no longer see any trace of the
atomistic assumptions of mutual impenetrability. It has become rather
as Leibniz writes in his monadology, that each unit, or rather monad,
envelops all the others, even as it expresses them at one and the same
time. His idea of the communication between substances surely can be
considered a precursor of these modern approaches. Serres himself
makes the following comment:
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We should note that in Leibniz we find a philosophy of the
communication of substances, side-by-side with a new physics
of elastic bodies. Hence we find him even at a young age
publicly stating that he did not accept the ideas of infinitely
hard atoms in empty space, and at no time thereafter
retracting this position. On the contrary, the ascertaining of
impenetrability and relative elasticity form an essential part of
his physics of communication.15
In a word, a philosophy of mixing and blending, a philosophy in
which the identity (identité) of one thing is achieved in combination
with others and even an arising together with them: it is such a view of
the world which we are once again now struggling to understand.16
Leibniz described his monads as differing not quantitatively (as they
were all one), but rather only qualitatively.17 We therefore have to under-
stand how many things can exist within one thing, as it were: how much
of what can we pack into a single thing. We have to take a good look
once again at the process of individuation, and when an individual
individuates, as it were, just what is possible and how it is possible for
that individual.18 There have been a multitude of previous assumptions
(cf. Carlos Castaneda’s The Great Assumptions About Individuation):
usually the individuator of the individual is seen to belong only the
individual itself, and usually the individuator of a thing is thought of as
the individual thing itself. We have to learn to question these assump-
tions.19 I believe it has become necessary for us now to take another
look at just what individuation is and how it occurs. Just what is it for a
culture, say, to maintain its own originality, and how does it arrive at it
in the first place? Serres gives us the following:
Individuation or differentiation happens as the way informa-
tion is taken in and stored, in the way a form is given and
then retained.20
The question may now arise of just where such “information” or
“form” comes from. It is with just this important question that we can
investigate further into the arising of individual things or cultures. In
order for an individual thing with its own distinctive qualities to arise or
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to be formed, we cannot think of it as just somehow arising out of the
blue, unconnected to any other thing. Of course, an objector might here
start to talk of “subjectivity” and adopt an existentialist stance in the
name of some sort of freedom, but I do not believe that this kind of
“lonely individual” is a good example of the way true individuation
occurs. This of course does not mean that I consider all discussions of
subjectivity irrelevant, and with structuralism maintain that the control
of underlying structures is responsible for everything we see. An indi-
vidual cannot grow without some sort of communication in language
with those around him (which refutes an existentialist approach of
absolute subjectivity), and yet it is even more important that he use the
language he has acquired to richly express his own personality in
various situations. Cultures also can be considered in this light, as a
process of learning and acquiring, and then a going beyond, almost as a
flower will need periods of both preparation and blooming.The process
of learning itself is a thematization through communication, leading to
a full flowering of this theme later on as the learning is expressed in
living. It is for this very reason that we should perhaps call individual
people and cultures not even “individuals” as such, but rather “ongoing
processes of individuation.”21 We use language to pass on our respective
cultures to succeeding generations. Of course, this process of trans-
mission is not limited to the use of language. Architecture, just to take
one other example out of many, can fulfil a similar function. As long as
a specific building exists, it can continue to act as a “production mold
for ceremonies” (un moule en creux des cérémonies)22: by its function as a
treasured building, it can play an important part in the creation and
continuation of a society or culture.23 First there must be that appear-
ance or existence of a certain form, which is required for any process of
individuation. However, this form appears as always in the process of
growing and re-forming itself, for the reason that were we to consider it
as complete, fully-formed and static, we would once again be under the
spell of thinking of cultures as “islands” or “spheres.” In short, form
cannot exist in complete isolation, nor can it permanently remain
unchanged. If we misunderstand this point, we fall into a combination
of idealism and hopelessness. It may be useful at this point to consider
the following extract from “Orientalism”, by Edward Said:
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Memory of the modern Orient disputes imagination, sends
one back to the imagination as a place preferable, for the
European sensibility, to the real Orient. For a person who has
never seen the Orient, Nerval once said to Gautier, a lotus is
still a lotus; for me it is only a kind of onion. To write about
the modern Orient is either to reveal an upsetting demystifi-
cation of images culled from texts, or to confine oneself to the
Orient of which Hugo spoke in his original preface to Les
Orientales, the Orient as “image” or “pensée”, symbols of
“une sorte de préoccupation générale (a kind of general pre-
occupation).” 24
Being taken in by such idealized, fixed images is certainly not uncom-
mon in our everyday conscious life. If we have a wonderful experience, or
perhaps one of intense suffering, we are sometimes apt to hold on to that
moment (even if unwillingly, in the case of the painful experience): it is
somehow that time, for us, stands still.25 Seen in this light, the Ideas of
Plato seem almost to be “snapshots”, as it were, of the most perfect
moment of things, and therefore, by “stopping time,” can thereby reveal a
kind of imperishability or immortality.26 On the other hand, together with
Bergson we might prefer to call this kind of “immortality” a kind of
“eternity of death.”27 Such a thing may be very beautiful, or rather may
have been very beautiful: there is definitely a kind of beauty to be found
there. However, this is a kind of nostalgic beauty,28 and even the memory
of it has a kind of aesthetic quality to it, and indeed a kind of beauty of its
own. The moment we believe we have at last been able to grasp an eter-
nal, unchanging Reality or Substance, in the same way we love a feeling
of quiet stability and peace, we then indeed experience a kind of Beauty.29
However, it is in the very moment that we believe we have succeeded in
grasping this Beauty, that it begins to degenerate and disappear, for in the
process of cutting the beautiful thing off from time and everything else,
we acquire a habit of no longer paying attention to the appearance of new
things, to the facts of change and growth. From here, we easily fall back
into the habit of seeing individual or isolated things as islands or spheres.
In contrast with this approach, a flower in the process of individuation
cannot be separated from the whole in which context it arises, and its
beauty seeks within that context to come to full fruition. Similarly, among
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the profusion of flowers we call cultures, each achieves its full beauty in
communication with the others. As one example of this kind of mutual
enrichment, we can remember the rise of Neoplatonism in Florence
during the Renaissance. As classical Greek ideas came together with
Christian ones, new developments became possible and, as is well-
known, this Neoplatonism in turn had a great influence on the works of
people such as Botticelli and others. Further back in history, Indian
Buddhism and Greek sculpture came together to create the magnificent
Gandhara style of Buddhist art. In Japan, the importation and thorough
digesting into Japanese of Chinese characters gave to the Japanese
language an immense increase in expressive power.
We can of course recognize here the influence of the whole, as it
works to shape the destinies of its individual parts. It is natural to think
here perhaps of this whole as a kind of Hegelian Dialectical Universal,
which guides, as it were, all the dialectical processes occurring within it
to itself. However, we are no longer so complacent as to believe this
anymore; no longer so self-unaware that we may blissfully use this kind
of concept as a comforter, for reassurance that after all, all will be well. It
is true that even within such a paradigm, “differing things” can meet,
influence each other in complex ways, and perhaps even give rise to new
things as a result. However, it is not always that new things must result
from such a dialectical process: the Hegelian Universal Whole retains the
power to place its own limits upon just what can possibly arise within it.
Also, in reality, it may be finally impossible to completely reconcile
varying opinions or occurrences into an overarching system which can
accommodate all of them. It is too easy, after all, to just speak of a
“universal whole” which can reconcile every sort of contradiction within
itself. We have lost our thoroughgoing faith in the European version of
the Ideal Spirit, or to put it in a different way, as Hegel states in his
Lectures on Aesthetics, the Age of Art has come to a close, and we are now
in the Age of Philosophy.30 We no longer see things in terms of a recon-
ciliation at the level of an ideal Universal Whole. We have come to see
that such a faith in itself just reflects a dreamy Idealism, and even a
Eurocentrism, and is therefore just another kind of the isolationistic
individuation mentioned above. If we attempt to impose such a para-
digm on the rest of the world, simply “pushing back the boundaries”, as
it were, we may achieve a “globalization” of sorts, but it will not be one
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in which true differences between cultures will find reconciliation.31
Finally, it is time to recognize that after all, it is no longer even possible
to apply such a paradigm of isolated cultural islands to the present true
state of the cultures in our world. We have to be willing to accept that
Intelligence itself is taking on whole new qualities and ways of being.
Where Intelligence used to be isolated and individuated, closed in and
clearly defined, “we have once again become nomads” (Pierre Lévy).32
Let us see what Lévy has to say about the possibilities offered by the
new kind of “collective intelligence”:
The space of the new monadism is not a geographical terri-
tory, not under the control of the various social orders or
nations, but is rather a space of consciousness, intelligence
and the ability to think. In such a space, the quality of
existence, the way of forming societies, is finally free to bloom
and grow. It is no longer maps drawn by powerful elements,
no longer the boundaries between the various academic
disciplines, no longer even the statistics of merchants, but
rather a space which possesses a truly human quality, and is
dynamic and full of life. It is what allows for the appearance
of all these phenomena, what they aim for.33
This collective intelligence strives for a “fundamental letting go” (un
lâcher-prise essentiel). It seeks to abolish ideas of identity, mechanisms of
control and domination, limitations on communication.34 It seeks also to
help individual separate ways of thinking give new life to each other, by
allowing them the fundamental freedom required for their true
interaction.35 We see in Said’s comments on Orientalism that this
approach clearly lacked a true “letting go”: Because the relationship
between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of domination,
of varying degrees of a complex hegemony.36 Orientalism is rather a dis-
tribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic,
sociological, historical and philosophical texts.37 This approach serves to
maintain established relationship between various disciplines, as defined
by power and domination. Deeply reflecting on this should obviously
enable us to share our knowledge and acknowledge it to others.38 Collec-
tive Intelligence is a form of universally distributed intelligence39.
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No one knows everything, everyone knows something; all knowl-
edge resides in humanity. There is no transcendent store of knowledge,
and knowledge is simply the sum of what we know.40
It will announce the voice of the many (la voix du multiple).41 Intel-
ligence must be understood here in its etymological sense of joining
together (travailler en bonne intelligence), as uniting not only ideas but
people, “constructing society” (intelligence avec ennemi)42. It is in this
way that we can truly begin to learn from others.
Even though I need to gather information and exchange ideas, even if
I am able to learn from the other, I’ll never know everything he knows.
Our need to listen to the other can never lead to the construction of
knowledge about him. We cannot simply capture his expertise or the
information he possesses. Apprenticeship, in the fullest sense of the
word, also implies that we confront the incomprehensibility, the irre-
ducibility of the world of the other, which is the basis of power for me.
The other remains enigmatic, becomes a desirable being in every res-
pect .43
Inquiring once again into what constitutes Collective Intelligence,
we find the following description of it:
It is a form of universally distributed intelligence, constantly
enhanced, coordinated in real time, and resulting in the effec-
tive mobilization of skills. I’ll add the following indispensable
characteristic to this definition: the basis and goal of collective
intelligence is the mutual recognition and enrichment of
individuals rather than the cult of fetishized or hypostatized
communities.44
It is very important that collective intelligence is a universally distri-
buted intelligence which in enhanced, coordinated, and mobilized in real
time,45 and that collective intelligence is not the cult of fetishized or
hypostatized communities. It is with such an approach that we can truly
escape from our habit of seeing culture as islands or spheres. Collective
intelligence must not be confused with totalitarian projects involving the
subordination of individuals to transcendent and fetishistic commu-
nities46. By contrast, the ant colony possesses a rigidly fixed structure;
the ants are sharply divided into castes and are interchangeable within
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those castes 47. The ant colony is the opposite of collective intelligence.48
Collective intelligence is born with a culture and grows with it.49 If this
is the case, then once a culture stops growing, we may say that its
collective intelligence begins to deteriorate and disappear. Lévy attempts
to take this collective intelligence, and to develop it on the basis of a
“space of intelligence”. I myself with to take it one step further, and
develop such a “space of intelligence” even further into what I wish to
call a “polyphonic, monadological space”. Lévy noticed already that “far
from merging individual intelligence into some indistinguishable
magma, collective intelligence is a process of growth, differentiation, and
the mutual revival of singularities”.50 In this way, we can see that he is
able to avoid a kind of melting-pot reduction of differences in a Hegelian
“ethical substance”. When we seek to further develop Lévy’s ideas into
the construction of the concept of a polyphonic, monadological space,
we must strive to respect and protect the real differences existing
between different cultures. We find a hint about how to go about this in
Lévy’s approach to the idea of “hospitality”. Hospitality is the perfect
representation of the maintenance of the social bond, one conceived in
accordance with the formula of reciprocity.51 L’hôte is likely to be either
receiver or the received.52 Hospitality sustains the possibility of travel, of
meeting the other.53 One must realize that one is oneself a traveller. The
person who can find the traveller within himself, within his deepest idea
of who he is, inescapably becomes a welcoming host (hospes) to other
such travellers.54 We do not refer here to some comfortable dialectical
universal: indeed, the fact is, this kind of Hegelian concept cannot be
understood in these terms at all. We must learn to find in our present
situation a kind of “negating” way of thinking.55 It is only in such
“mutually negating” terms that we can arrive at a complete vision of the
real dialectic occurring in reality. The most famous philosopher of
modern Japan, Kitaro Nishida, arrived at the concept of a “generative or
creative monadology,” which has far-reaching applications in modern
aesthetics and transcultural aesthetics, as will be shown below.
Nishida’s “creative monadology” has also been referred to as a
“dialectical monadology,” 56 and the differences between his approach
and the traditional monadology of Leibniz should become apparent in
the following description:
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When we first start to think about individuals as represen-
tative units, the idea of a monadology may seem stunning and
unsurpassable in its intricacies and its scale, but I cannot
agree with Leibniz’s ideas as they stand. I rather wish to insist
that individuals interact, work on each other and negate each
other. Paradoxically, it is by negating themselves that they
affirm themselves.They are born into the world, and they die:
individuals are not monads created unborn and imperishable
by God. The latter kind are merely products of thought; pro-
ducts of the imagination. I rather see individuals existing in
truly dialectical relationships, each to the others.57
Nishida perceived that there did not exist an idea of dialectic at the
base of the monadology as proposed by Leibniz.58 For this reason, the
relationships existing between God and the monads were in no way
paradoxical: the monads just existed in a sort of representative way, and
they never arrived at a point of their existence being put radically into
question, at a point of having lost all hope, as it were.59 However, if we
then consider the relationships existing between the monads to be
dialectical in the Hegelian sense, we would have a situation where the
monads would be swallowed up, as it were, and disappearing in the
ethical substance which is the goal of his dialectical process, and
thereby losing their independent identities as monads. This kind of
dialectical opposition and the universal whole that accompanies the
sublation of such opposition can be seen as a clear product of a Euro-
centric way of thinking of “rational reality”.To this way of thinking, the
individuals have, a priori, by definition no hope of maintaining their
independent existence. The universal reigns over all, even as it keeps its
own substantiality. It is this kind of dialectic that Nishida criticized,
calling it “noematic,” i.e. just a product of thought, and not a true
reflection of how things really are.60 As he says, when we just intellec-
tually consider a unification of various things, they must necessarily
lose their individual identities in this process.61 It is for this reason that
the truly independent individuals become impossible within the context
of a Hegelian dialectic.62 If we see at the basis of the progress of history
a fundamental substance or a permanent substrate of some kind, the
various events of history then become just a series of appearances of
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this fundamental substrate in various forms. It then becomes impossible
to consider historical events as being unique and unrepeatable, and there
really is no place in the system for us as agents working independently
and of our own free will.63 It is for this reason that we must see the
historical world not as something with a substantial foundation, but
rather purely as a series of events, as a world of occurrences with no
underlying substrate.64 This is the way of looking at the world not as a
collection of fixed things, but rather as a process of fluid events, arising
and disappearing moment by moment.65 This way of thinking removes
any kind of permanent substance from the events that arise, and enter
into relationships with each other in a space (topos) that allows for these
events and relationships to arise. This way of thinking therefore
integrates “Buddhist Emptiness” 66 into the dialectical process, and
might be therefore termed “Buddhist dialectics.” 67 Not only is the Uni-
versal seen in this light as not possessing any substantial existence, but
also each individual lacks such an underlying substrate as well: it is
purely through the process of opposition to each other that they
become what they are.68 This then gives rise to a fundamental contra-
diction in the nature of the individuals,69 as described in the following
extract:
When individuals are thought of as true individuals, each must by
definition possess an absolutely independent existence, and they must
be considered as not requiring any kind of medium or setting: they
must be absolutely free to decide what they will be in themselves. And
yet, they also negate themselves, in that they acquire existence as indi-
viduals only as they appear in relation to other individuals, and there-
fore can be said after all to possess a sort of medium or condition for
their existence as individuals.70
And so we find a contradiction arising in the idea that individuals,
which should theoretically be independent from any medium or external
definition of their existence, actually depend on their mutual defining of
each other for their existence as individuals: they therefore must
simultaneously possess both a non-mediated and a mediated existence!
When we face this kind of contradiction, we might attempt to eliminate
it with logic, and with an approach which strives for a substantial
universality. We might try to show that all dialectical contradictions are
sublated into the Universal: not just that there is a dialectical progression
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toward universality, but that the individual elements actually lose their
independent existence in the universal substance. Indeed, this would be
what we call the “European” way of attempting to solve the above
contradiction.71 Needless to say, this is not the approach used by Nishida
in discussing the contradiction inherent in the existence of individuals.
He rather pictures a generative or creative universe, where the contradic-
tions are not eliminated, but rather are part of the mutual relationships
between the various aspects of reality. The idea of individuals and the
idea of the Universal both contain similar inherent contradictions, and
even the relationship they are in to each other contains contradictory
aspects to it, as a little thought along these lines will reveal.72 Nishida’s
way of explaining this is to put the multiplicity of individuals in
relationship with each other with a medium or on a background, as it
were, of absolute negation, which both allows them to enter into such a
relationship and makes them what they are.73 If we attempt to reconcile
the contradictions by postulating a comfortable substantial background
for the individuals, they paradoxically lose their ability to exist relative to
each other, and would no longer be free to be creative and generative on
their own. It is for this reason that Nishida states:
A world in which absolute negation serves the function of
mediating between individuals, is a world which both creates
and is created at one and the same time; a generative/generated
world. Each individual point in such a world is a separate
origin of this process of creation, and so we must say that this
world is one in which the arising and disappearance of indi-
vidual things takes place in a context of absolute negation.74
Furthermore, this creative/created world is a world in which forms
determine their own form, which, Nishida notes,75 is understandable if
we think about the way Leibniz has defined the existence of his
monads. In Nishida’s case, however, monads are not substances, but
rather fluid events, as it were. The world is not a transformation of one
substantial thing into another, but rather a series of events, with no
ontological substrate underlying their separate appearance in time.76 As
a concrete example of thing that clearly exists in this way, Nishida
refers to the short Japanese haiku poem by way of illustration.This kind
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of poem takes a kind of “snapshot” of the world from a single point of
view, and what it succeeds in capturing is not a substantial entity or
thing, but rather a momentary event.77 This procession from event to
event can also be seen as the working of these individual events or
individuals upon each other. As the following extract illustrates, it can
even lead to a branching off in different directions of various worlds:
Things that act or do work, do so as individual worlds in
themselves, and stand in opposition to the worlds defined by
other similarly-working things. This is what is meant by
saying that individuals are defined in opposition to other indi-
viduals.78
Can these mutually-opposed worlds, branching out in different
directions as it were, be considered equally beautiful each in their own
ways? This is the central issue of this whole discussion. From the above,
it has surely become clear that the when various individual things,
various worlds, various cultures and so on are considered to exist as
concrete substances in themselves, we are limited to seeing such cul-
tures only as isolated islands or spheres. We have also seen that when
the comprehensive universal is considered to exist substantially and
concretely in a similar way, we again arrive at the problems related to
such a dialectical universal, as described above. It is for these reasons
that we had to consider both universals and individuals as having no
substantial existence in themselves. Indeed, Nishida’s creative monadol-
ogy is just such an answer to the problems which arise in association
with ideas of substantiality. It must also be appreciated that Nishida
then took his solution one step further, with his idea of the crea-
tive/created world. Just what kind of world is this, what kind of space?
We may find an understanding of it in the following words:
Things that act or do work do so not in simply empty space,
but rather in a space that its own qualitative existence, as a
field of force or energy.79
At what time can we say that such a space, defined not simply as
quantitative and empty, but rather as qualitative and meaning-filled, is
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“beautiful”? It is this kind of space that I wish to make the topic of the
remaining part of this essay, and that I wish to call “polyphonic.”
Although it may not seem necessary to define the term “poly-
phony,” it may nevertheless be interesting to remember that this
musical term refers to the sounds of various voices each arising in
relation to one another. Over the history of Western music, this kind of
polyphonic relationship seems to have started in Gregorian chant, in
which all the voices chanted a similar melodic pattern and only differed
from each other in pitch by a fourth or a fifth. There then gradually
started to be movement in opposing directions, with one voice rising
while the other fell or vice versa, and with still more complex develop-
ments leading us to the polyphonic music of today.80 In the creation of
such polyphony, each singer must listen carefully to and anticipate the
productions of other singers, even as he or she also gives careful atten-
tion to singing his or her own part. There is no postulating of a fixed
“transcendental listener,” as it were, separate from the singers them-
selves.81 It is just the productions of a number of voices reflecting off
each other even while they listen to each other; the projective transfor-
mation or supporting response of these voices of and to each other.82
There is no one voice which can special precedence over all the others.
However, after the well-known Council of Trent, it was decided that the
special musical qualities of polyphony only served to distract the
faithful from their attention to purely religious things, and its perfor-
mance was publicly banned.83 During the Renaissance, the unification
derived from the power of the anti-religious revolution was again not a
kind of harmonious unity. Around the sixteenth century, there was an
attempt made to revive ancient Greek music by a humanistic group in
Florence, called Camerata. Based on their unique interpretation of this
ancient music, they also forbade polyphony and advanced a kind of
homophony called monody.84 This then became the origins of modern
opera, and finally also developed into the music of the early Baroque
period.85 The point to be carefully noted here is that polyphony can be
seen broadly as either counterpoint, in which two or more voices
simultaneously sing either similar or different melodies at different
pitches, or specifically as being the kind of multi-voiced singing which
existed in the middle ages and during the Renaissance, before Bach and
the baroque period in general. After the baroque, the simultaneous
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singing of a melodic pattern by many different voices was seen to be
too complicated, so it was streamlined and unified to provide a more
harmonious sound.86 Whereas before no specific voice had the special
privilege of being the lead,87 homophony, which stressed harmony, sim-
plified this situation and gave precedence to the highest voice in most
cases. This kind of music, which postulated a lead part and an accom-
paniment,88 then replaced true polyphony.
Coming back to our discussion of culture, a true polyphony does
not postulate one specially privileged, transcendentally established, cul-
ture which can claim to dominate other cultures, but rather accepts the
possibility of a multitude of cultures, without feeling the need to say
that one has absolute precedence over the others. In other words, until
now, there has been just this kind of assigning of precedence to partic-
ular cultures. For the most part, “Western Culture” has been assigned
this role as a matter of course, but we now see that this era with its way
of thinking has come to a close.
Indeed it is we ourselves who must finally put the nail in its coffin.
Without such a determined approach, both the beautiful roses of the
West and the beautiful lotuses of the East will fade and wither away. In
order to prevent such a tragedy, we must work quickly to build new
aesthetic paradigms, and this will require a truly transcultural aesthetics
to lead the way. I would like to propose the following quotation as a hint
towards the building of such a new aesthetic perspective:
In our modern world, we witness a lack of understanding,
misunderstandings, and struggles between various peoples,
various cultures, and various civilizations at various stages of
development. In a certain sense, this world is becoming ever
more energized and transformed. As no quick solution to
these differences is ready to hand, virtually everyone agrees
that the world would be a much better place if we could at
least recognize the existence of such differences—as the
foundation of mutual understanding—and if at all possible to
respect others, even love others as others.
On the one hand, forms of poetry such as renga, renku
and renshi respect the differences between each of the parti-
cipant-poets, and on the other, it nevertheless offers a form in
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which they can cooperate to create a living harmony which
springs forth as a result of this cooperation. Given the present
state of our civilization, we clearly can see the reason why
even non-Japanese poets are interested in these poetical
forms: they feel these ancient forms of poetry offer us an
indication of just how we might start anew to rebuild our
world together.89
Although the above quotation is right on the mark, for the purposes
of the present argument, I would just like to change the words “har-
mony” to “polyphony.” The polyphonic singing of a melody by no
means requires the voices to meld into an indistinguishable mass.90 In a
word, the difference between harmony and polyphony, the former lies in
the direction of closure, whereas the latter remains continually open.
Hegel’s dialectic is, as pointed out by Alain, a “continual invention” (une
continuelle invention), it is indeed “understanding creation appearing out
of opposition, following ordered logic, we find the next element.”91 For
any transition that appears within that movement, in the same way that
these various transitions possess Ideas, they also create new Ideas as well,
because it becomes necessary to find a new Idea that can “save”, as it
were, these two elements from the opposition they are in.92 The problem
with this traditional dialectic, however, lies in the way these two ideas are
saved. I personally believe that the general way of thinking prevalent in
Hegel’s time had a great influence in this respect. Using the distinction
above, it would seem to be a kind of “harmonic saving.” There remains,
however, also a “polyphonic saving.” This polyphonic kind is exactly the
kind described in the quotation above, the kind of “saving” that occurs in
the poetic forms of renga, renku and renshi.
Renga is one kind of traditional form of Japanese poetry, and is an art
that is done at gatherings, or za in Japanese. To the initial short stanza
(made up of three lines of five, seven and five syllables respectively) is
added (in many cases, by another person) another short stanza of two
lines of seven syllables each.Then another five/seven/five stanza is added,
and so on, as the poem develops and continues in this way. For example,
three people might get together and each add one stanza at a time in
turn. A kind of gathering called za is then created, which might equally
be called, after Nishida, Basho or topos, place or field instead. One might
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call this an art of conversation of a sort, or perhaps a refinement to a
very high degree of the kinds of phrases one might exchange in greeting.
Furthermore, one could think of it as the very opposite93 of the kind of
modern art which is far too obsessed with its own inspirations and
individualized completely out of the reach of beauty. It is not, as may be
gathered from the description above, a “lonely” or a “secret” art94: its
fundamental difference from this kind of modern creation is in the fact
that it is the cooperatively-created work of two or more people around a
particular theme.95 We further see its difference in that it is not limited to
having given topics, contents or expressions, nor do we see it tied down
to a particular way of thinking or feeling.96 In fact, it tends to have as an
unspoken rule that it should not be limited to any one topic, but rather
that as new stanzas are added, there should be a “drift,” as it were, in the
various topics highlighted by each stanza.97 The process of creation of
renga and renku seems almost to have a kind of centrifugal energy, an
approach of “ever onward, ever outward!” Each individual stanza is the
creation of a different poet, who absorbs the mood of the previous one,
and then adds his stanza, which not only gives even further life to the
original feeling of its predecessor, putting his own “spin” on it, as it
were.98 The creation of the previous poet, its “stance” as it were, is
respected, and yet his successor is also free to express his own creativity
to the fullest degree.99 This whole process occurs on a topos called the
za. Needless to say, this za is not just an area of some trigonometrically-
defined “empty space.” Stated in another way, it is not that, through the
medium of space defined as giving a form to sensibility, a phenomeno-
logical object created by a subjective viewpoint is located in space
somewhere. We may venture to say that it is instead where the “durées”
assigned to each existing thing by Bergson (in the process of his criti-
cisms of Kantian philosophy) meet; a topos for their coming together.
Nishida also founds the establishment of his Logic of the Basho of
Absolute Nothingness on just this point. He writes as follows:
If we consider the Basho of Absolute Nothingness to be like a
circle with its centre everywhere and its circumference now-
here, then we can see an infinite number of times being given
rise to by its centre that is everywhere. True eternity is not
simply a transcending of time, as it were, but rather a Basho
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of the kind described above, upon which an infinite number
of time centres can appear.100
It is important to take careful note of the expression “a kind of Basho
upon which an infinite number of time centres can appear” given by
Nishida above. In order to give a concrete illustration of this concept, we
can simply think of the za of the renga-creating gathering. However, in
order to first make this way of thinking even easier to grasp, we will take
a little detour, as it were, into another concept: that of the garden. A
garden gives us a good example of a place, topos or Basho of the coming
together in collocation of the various durées of its various plants.
As Bergson says, if we want to make a glass of sugar water, we must
wait for the sugar to melt in it.101 This example is useful in that it gives us
an illustration of how my durée, experienced as the irritation of waiting
for the sugar to melt, can be qualitatively different from the rhythm of
the durée of the melting sugar itself. The illustration works so well
because it takes the abstract principle and shows just how it appears in
concrete, experienced reality or space.102 When the subject turns to
Leibniz’s monadology also, it would not be surprising to find in the
history of the development of his ideas a special, qualitatively different
way of existing in time for each monad we consider.103 We must be
careful, however, this quality of existing in time is not direct, but rather
indirect, as we can only grasp this temporality through the appearance
of a physical body in space. This is exactly the way we can gain a new
perspective on the problem of space itself. Although monads are defined
as having no extension, they possess a certain location (situs) within
Extension or space itself.104 In other words, each monad enters into an
ordered relationship of coexistentia with all the other monads by virtue
of its controlling (praesum), and expressing itself through, a physical
body.105 If we wish to discuss the spatiality of monads, the idea that
although they have no extension, they have a location in space, makes us
think of them as having a kind of nesting (“Russian doll”) structure, one
layer inside another. The various differing durées are inserted in this
fashion, as it were, into the space, and therefore find their place in it as
well. When Leibniz discovered that with the microscope one could see
human sperm, the fact that there could be “spermatic animals” (des
animaux spermatiques) inside an individual human body gave him great
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cause for surprise. It is perhaps because of this surprise that he then
proceeds to give us a view of the universe which borders on fairy-tale: in
even the smallest particle of matter, it is possible to state that there exists
an infinite number of creatures, of organisms, of animals, with their
entelechia and even souls.106 Every bit of matter can be thought of as if it
were a garden filled with plants, or a pond full of fish.107 Each branch of
these plants, each part of each fish, each drop of water in the pond, is
again a whole new garden in itself, a whole new pond.108 The earth and
air between the plants and the water between the fish are not in them-
selves plants or fish, but they are considered as containing (contenir)
such plants and fish in their turn.109 When we take this approach, indeed,
we might be misled into thinking each part of the physical universe
expresses the entire universe. We should actually be more specific and
point out that each of these parts contains a living thing, which
subjectively determines the universe for itself from its own point of view.
Each of these living things is a “field” or “place” for the apparition of a
monad.110 It is interesting to note in this connection that religions with a
strong tendency to animism, such as Hinduism and Japanese Shinto,
objects of whatever kind can become the place for the self-revelation of
the Divine through their possessing form. This idea of the Divine
expressing itself in form is called yorishiro in Japanese. Yorishiro objects
traditionally used in the past have been evergreen trees (cedars, pines,
sakaki, bamboo and so on), and in fact, we can actually see many of
these types of trees in parks with fountains or pools, where it may also
be possible to sail a little craft around or at least walk about the park. (By
the way, sometimes foreigners are surprised that the “water” in the
garden is often just symbolized by small stones or gravel.This is called a
kare-sansui, or dry landscape, garden.) We should also remember in this
connection that the Japanese art of flower arranging called ikebana also
is thought by some to have its origins in this kind of yorishiro expressing
of the Divine in form. Any given location or “field” (ba in Japanese) is a
location for the apparition of a soul. I would like to take the above ideas
and extend them even further, and use for the discussion of yorishiro
even the total landscape containing the garden.This will of course be for
the purposes of illustrating more concretely just what is meant by a
“monadological space.” It will be useful in this connection to listen to
the French philosopher Alain, who writes as follows:
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The gardener does not imitate Nature: he obeys it. Nature
appears as an integral part of his work, its accomplice, its
very source. Indeed, in that artificial garden, with its steps, its
pathways and its profusion of greenery, it is indeed Nature
which reveals itself, but we also see the man himself.111
This beautiful work that is a garden, this architectural painting (cette
peinture architecturale)112 must continually protect its style obtained
through obedience (le style par l’obéissance)113 to Nature. The artist we
refer to as the gardener, must obey nature, the changing of the seasons,
the varying amounts of water, air and light.114 In other words, if he does
not take into account durées different from his own, he will not be able to
create his art. He must learn to respect the various durées that proceed
each at their own pace. And in order to act on this respect and truly
express it, he must develop techniques which integrate an appreciation
not only for each of the individual durées, but also of the location that
allows for the apparition of these various durées in space. This of course
does not mean, however, that the individual durées lose their individuality
to meld into this one space, and this is because the space itself, the garden
itself, appears after all only on the basis of each individual element in it. A
powerful philosophical description was given of this kind of mutual
relationship between individual things and the space in which they
appear, once again by Kitaro Nishida: his so-called “Logic of Basho”. Let
us consider the experience of someone walking through the garden. One
by one, he encounters differing durées in the natural things he sees as he
walks. Sometimes the durées must coordinate with each other; sometimes
the difference between them becomes a source of artistic satisfaction.We
should note here that these events arise as a direct result of the person’s
action of walking around the space in the garden as an embodied being.
At any rate, these various events are each given form in their turn by the
walker: this space which could be called monadological, arises anew
every moment: it is perpetually in a process of becoming and changing.
Together with this space, the monads in it as well appear and disappear,
are born and die, moment to moment. This description differs from
Leibniz’s ideas in that the monads themselves can be born and then
disappear. We might think of it as a developed explanation of what was
called in the Christian church the theory of “continuous creation” (creatio
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continua), although this paradigm does not postulate a God to create
these monads. Buddhism speaks of the “momentaneity” (in Sanskrit,
ksanabhangasiddhi) of things. The total field gives rise to the individual
elements in it, and these elements in their turn give rise to the field: they
are in a relationship of mutual dependence. This also bears some
resemblance to the theory of “conditioned arising,” in Japanese engi. It is
important to remember that the things which are in relationship to one
another do not have any immutable substance of their own, and nor does
the space which acts as their setting. This kind of space or field indicates
the fundamental way of existing of the kind of space we have been
searching for throughout this paper. It is a space of beauty, which allows
both for a plurality of identities (being monadological), and also allowing
these identities to each express themselves as they are (being
polyphonic). This kind of generative space can itself be considered a
work of art. Bringing the topic back to culture once again, we remember
the vital function performed by the traveller in the discussion above of
hospitality. This traveller can be compared to the walker through the
garden, where different things are able to meet and discover each other.
Returning at last to our discussion of renga, we should note that,
compared to a garden, renga is a much higher-level human production.
However, the humans that produce it are seen in a different way that in
the modern way of thinking characterized by individualism. It was for
this very reason that when Japan entered the modern era with a
vengeance, the renga poem suffered a temporary eclipse. The question
was raised: How can we consider something to be Art if it has no fixed
theme, nor any format or shape which accords with such a theme? 115
Writers who stressed the expression of emotion in literature, such as
Shiki Masaoka, just gave their own part of the poem and considered it
finished, thereby avoiding having to work together with another poet
for a complete creation. In this way, they maintained, the poet could be
free to give best expression to his individual feelings.116 This “modern
form of renga” is the haiku. These days, however, renga and renku have
once again come back into fashion. It is fascinating to note that this
interest once again flowered with the problems raised by modern
thought. In other words, it seems that in these poetic forms were found
a way out of the modern impasse, as well as new possibilities of aes-
thetic expression. I personally would like to term it an “Aesthetics of
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Basho,” after Nishida’s “Logic of Basho”. The sequential addition of
new stanzas, as the renku grows, allows for the birth of new meanings
and interpretations, and out of the “slippage” of their successive inter-
pretations, the work continues to grow in beauty.117 If we then consider
individuals and societies as not having fixed immutable substance, we
can see them arising every moment anew on a background of true
emptiness. They arise, meet, part, and then dissolve once again into the
Emptiness whence they came. A true Aesthetics of Basho rejects solidi-
fications into “substance”. Once solidification has occurred, the same
themes are simply repeated ad infinitum, and the culture or individual
is as good as dead. It may be important to note in this connection that
just because an Aesthetics of Basho rejects the assumption of an
underlying substance, it is not for this reason based on a nihilistic view
of the universe, for reasons we will go into below. As it does not base
itself atomistic assumptions either of indestructible substances or of
immortal, indestructible souls, it aims to, and indeed can create works
with a distinctive qualities of flexibility, pliability and lightness. Surely
this is an important gift from the Orient for the present situation in
Western thought and culture. It is a kind of artistic creation which is
best represented in literature by the concrete form of the renga. By
critically analysing whether it is necessary to consider the writer as a
substantially-existing conveyor of information, we can get a closer view
of the differences between the Western paradigm of creative activity
which focuses on the individual artist, and an Oriental (or Japanese)
way of seeing the creative process. It is fascinating to realize that in the
ba or place of creation of the renga or renku, participants are not free to
just do or say whatever they like, because the ba itself contains a certain
kind of evaluative authority to judge the quality of their productions.
We can see this way of thinking already being put into practice in the
interest generated by the renga and renshi written by Octavio Paz118, the
Nobel Prize winner for Literature, as well as in the attempts by the
Japanese poet Makoto Ooka to travel around the many countries of
Europe and engage local poets in the creation of renshi. It is also com-
monly known that Eisenstein was influenced by renga to develop an
approach for his movies based on the presentation of a montage, in
which certain scenes and shots are designed to impact upon each other.
Furthermore, the Japanese scientist Torahiko Terada analyzed the
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appearance of this kind of montage approach in ikebana, Japanese gar-
den design, and the painting of hanging scrolls. It is deeply fascinating
to compare his ideas in this respect with the ones mentioned above
about the experience of a garden.119 Once a setting or ba is established,
a kind of resonance arises between the different thoughts which arise in
this space,120 giving rise to a coherence. We should not forget the exis-
tence of kind of coherence in relation to the self-organization of modern
science. In witnessing all these recent developments in so many
different fields, I was encouraged to bring all these threads together in a
philosophical way. I wish to do my part as an Oriental myself to help
extract the illusion of substantiality or essence from the Western philo-
sophical approach as described in the quotation below, without at the
same time falling into a nihilistic position. In this way, we can be aware
of a particular kind of beauty that is possible to create, and can be
motivated to study and analyze it in a systematic way.
Even without the existence of an “essence” or the way of seeing pre-
supposed by assumptions of “essence”, the real world we live in still
retains its reality. Events arise even without an underlying “essence”.
Even when we completely eradicate the idea of essence from our minds,
the empirical world we experience cannot be perceived in nihilistic
terms, nor does it just disappear into a kind of dream or illusion. The
recognition of reality sometimes takes on particular forms in the various
schools of thought within the whole tradition of Eastern philosophy, and
the importance of this kind of Oriental thought pattern can be clearly
found in Mahayana Buddhism.121
At any rate, from whatever point of view we look at it, the small
individual worlds into which we were locked open up, worlds meet
worlds, and they overlap and become an immensely rich, open, quali-
tative space. Such a space is polyphonic, as so many voices are clearly
heard each in their own way. This leaves individuals free to express
their vision in this open space of creativity. Each one is a world in
themselves, and the result is similar to what Leibniz had in mind with
his monadology, with the obvious exception that where Leibniz postu-
lated substantial entities, this approach does not. Once we rid ourselves
of the obsession with substance, it may be that we will finally be able to
hear the voice of the other. In the creation of renga, such enlightened
participants listen to the multitude of voices as a true polyphony, even
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as they are securely rooted in their own existence and create from their
point of view. It is my belief, therefore, that such a polyphonic, mon-
adological creative space can be the basis for the arising of a true
transcultural aesthetics.
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